This article examines the effects of family involvement on dividend policy in closely held firms that face agency problems involving majority-minority shareholders. We argue that minority shareholders press for dividends when they perceive situations fostering wealth expropriation. Looking at 458 Colombian companies, we find that family involvement in management does not impact dividend policy; family involvement in both ownership and control through pyramids impacts dividend policy negatively; family involvement in control through disproportionate board representation affects dividend policy positively. Thus, family influence on agency problems, and hence on dividend policy as a mitigating mechanism, varies depending on family involvement.
Introduction
Current literature on corporate governance and agency theory highlights how ownership structures affect corporate finance decisions. Ownership concentration might increase oversight on firm management and generate certain shared benefits of control for minority shareholders; but it might also facilitate the acquisition of private benefits of control at the expense of minority shareholders (Barclay & Holderness, 1989; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Villalonga & Amit, 2010) . Family firms are not immune to agency conflicts, and in certain circumstances could exacerbate it (Schulze et al., 2001; Uhlaner et al., 2007; Songini & Gnan, 2013) . Moreover, "…as the separation of ownership from control in widely held firms drives a wedge between the interests of principal and agent, the dispersion of ownership in family-held firms drives a wedge between the interest of those who lead a firm-and often own a controlling interest-and other family owners" (Schulze, et al. 2003; p. 181) .
Dividends can be used as a mechanism to mitigate several types of agency problems.
Theoretical arguments by Rozeff (1982) , Easterbrook (1984) , and Jensen (1986) suggest that dividends reduce the free cash flow controlled by insiders, thus reducing agency conflicts between management/owners, debt-holders/shareholders, and majority/minority shareholders. A vast amount of empirical literature has deal with these issues in the context of large listed firms (See Michaely & Roberts, 2012) . However, little is known on how dividends could be used to alleviate agency problems in closely held family firms that face potential majority versus minority shareholders agency problem.
Using a database of 458 Colombian companies spanning the 1996-2006 period, we examine family involvement effects on dividend policy, as an agency costs mitigating mechanism, in the context of closely held firms where there is certain level of ownership dispersion. Our main argument is that minority shareholders press for dividends, and therefore increase the likelihood of dividend payments and their level, when they perceive situations fostering wealth expropriation.
We find that family influence on majority versus minority shareholder agency conflicts differs according to type of family involvement. Our main findings can be summarized as follows: First, we find that family involvement in management (FIM) has no statistical significance in explaining dividend policy as a mechanism to mitigate agency conflicts, suggesting that family CEOs neither alleviate nor worsen agency problems between majority and minority shareholders.
Second, family involvement in ownership (FIO) increase the likelihood of supervision over the CEO and reduce the probability of opportunistic behavior, creating shared benefits of control for minority shareholders that exceed other agency costs generated by ownership concentration.
Consistent with this idea, we find that FIO has a significant negative effect on the firm's dividend policy.
Third, we find that family involvement in control (FIC) through pyramidal structures impacts dividend policy negatively. Although pyramids, as a control-enhancing mechanism, allow families to extract pecuniary and non-pecuniary private benefits, contestability among majority and minority shareholders within pyramids might mitigate agency problems counterbalancing the negative effects. This is possible in our context because minority shareholders in Colombian closely held firms are generally sophisticated investors, such as wealthy families, equity and pension funds, international investors and other large private firms. Finally, we find that FIC through a disproportionate family board representation increases significantly the amount and likelihood of dividend payment. This kind of involvement could elicit the adverse effects associated with a pure control-enhance mechanism, hence minority shareholders try to remove free cash flow from the CEO to avoid misuse or wealth expropriation. This paper contributes to the current empirical literature on corporate finance, governance, and family firms in several ways. First, this is among the few papers that deal with dividends as mitigating mechanisms alleviating the majority-minority shareholders agency tensions within the context of closely held family firms. Our results contribute to the growing literature on agency problems inside family firms (Schulze et al. 2003; Schulze et al. 2001; Clarysse et al., 2007;  Martin de Holan & Sanz, 2006; Block, 2012) .
Second, family firms are the most widespread form of organizational structure (La Porta et al, 1999) , and although family firms have received considerable attention in the financial and management literature, most of the empirical findings are based on listed firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006 Sacristán-Navarro & Gómez-Ansón, 2007 , Kowalewski et al., 2010 and conclusions from these samples may not be applicable in closely held firms (Bettinelli, 2011) . Therefore, this paper contributes to a better understanding of closely held firms, which is an important understudied subject.
Third, research on family firms usually views a family business as a single unit, ignoring the different ways families may influence corporate finance and governance decisions. This study follows the approach of Villalonga & Amit (2006 , considering family involvement in three dimensions: management, ownership, and control (pyramids and disproportionate board representation).
Fourth, even though the sample is restricted to Colombia, this context contributes to a better understanding of family-firms not only in Latin America but also in other emerging markets generally characterized by low investor protection, family involvement, high ownership concentration, and pyramidal structures through business groups aimed at enhancing firm's control. Family firms in emerging markets are an important yet highly understudied subject, as noted in recent surveys of the state of research on corporate governance in emerging markets (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013; Fan et al. 2011 ).
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: In the next section we present the theoretical framework on family firms and dividends within the agency context and develop our hypotheses. We then discuss the empirical design concerning data and methodology. Next we present the main results and robustness checks. And finally, we discuss our findings and conclude.
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses

Agency cost and dividends: An overview
Dividend policy is one of the most thoroughly researched subjects in modern corporate finance. Miller & Modigliani (1961) show that in a world of perfect information and frictionless capital markets, dividend policy is irrelevant for the firm's market value. However, in the real world firms operate in an environment of asymmetric information and multiple agency conflicts, where dividends play a key role. Jensen (1986) among others examines dividends as a mechanism to mitigate agency problems when managers pursue their own interest; in his "free cash flow problem", insiders can increase their perks consumption only to the extent the firm has enough free cash flow to do so. A number of empirical studies show that agency problems associated with free cash flow are significant in the United States and elsewhere (Denis & McConnell, 2003; Durnev et al. 2004 ). Higher dividend payments imply lower agency costs and improved corporate governance. Nonetheless, a country's level of investor protection affects the relationship between dividends and agency costs. La Porta et al. (2000) suggest that legal mechanisms supporting good governance lead to high dividends. These empirical findings are drawn from large listed firms, but little is known about the role of dividends to alleviate agency tensions in the context of closely held family firms. Clarysse et al. (2007) examine the tensions that exist between the founding team and other stakeholders in the context of closely held Belgian firms. In a review of several papers based on closely held family firms, Uhlaner, et al. (2007) hold that "it is too simplistic to presume that all family firms are necessarily less vulnerable to the agency principles" (p. 232). Songini & Gnan (2013) highlight several conflicts of interest and agency problems within the family business context. Moreover, Schulze et al. (2003) claim that controlling owners can extract resources from the firm to favor family members at the expense of other non-family shareholders or other family factions, but this is possible only if the controlling owner has at hand enough free cash flow.
Latin American companies generally and Colombian firms in particular provide a favorable context to study the influence of family involvement on dividend policy; low levels of investor protection, prevalence of closely held firms, affiliation with business groups, and common use of pyramidal structures make for a setting that allows for studying how minority shareholders in family firms deal with the potential agency conflicts that this type of firm generates, and how these problems affect dividend policy. Claessens et al. (2000) , drawing on a sample of Asian firms, show the possibility of expropriation is especially high when a company is affiliated with a business group. Moreover, Faccio, Lang & Young (2001) find expropriation of outside shareholders by the controlling shareholder to be the leading agency problem in countries with highly concentrated family ownership and control, where families almost always provide the firm's CEO. Empirical data from Latin America show that dividends play a key role in limiting expropriation by insiders; both Garay & González (2008) and Chong & López-de-Silanes (2007) report a positive relation between good corporate governance and a high level of dividends.
We next propose hypotheses that relate the three dimensions of family involvement (management, ownership and control) to the firm's dividend policy, as a mitigating mechanism of majority-minority agency tension in the context of closely held family firms.
Family involvement in management
In the context of the above discussion, alignment of interest means that no dividends or lower dividends are required. Classical agency theory may assume that when there is a family CEO there is no agency problem and thus no dividends are needed. Fama & Jensen (1983) argue that family management reduces agency cost because the incentives of owners and managers are fully aligned. However, FIM may either reduce or increase agency problems.
De Massis et al. (2013) argue that increasing degrees of FIM may be expected to decrease the moral hazard risks associated with the incentives of managers to behave opportunistically at the expense of minority shareholders. Several researchers show that family CEOs are significantly and positively related to the financial performance of family firms, which could imply less agency conflicts (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Dyer, 2006; Kowalewski, Talavera, & Stetsyuk, 2010, among others) .
However, we cannot assume that a family manager will always act in favor of minority shareholders (other family members or non-family shareholders). Sciascia & Mazzola (2008) suggest that the positive effects linked to FIM do not appear strong enough to compensate for its disadvantages. Morck and Yeung (2003) state that FIM does not necessarily mitigate agency problems; indeed, when families run a firm they may extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders (Sacristán-Navarro, Gómez-Ansón, & Cabeza-García, 2011), leading to managerial entrenchment (Demsetz, 1983) . Morck, Shleifer & Vishny (1988) assert that CEOs can achieve considerable entrenchment by different means, such as belonging to the founding family. Schulze et al. (2003) argue that altruism can create a sense of entitlement among founding family members by encouraging a family CEO to use a firm's resources to provide family members with employment, perquisites, and privileges they would not otherwise receive.
Accordingly, the presence of noneconomic preferences creates potentially serious agency problems in family firms; even as both family and non-family minority shareholders could be expected to share common economic interests -e.g., profitability, growth, market share -there is no reason to believe they share common noneconomic preferences (Schulze et al. 2001) . Lee & Rogoff (1996) and Bertrand & Schoar (2006) , argue that family-firm goals may include nonfinancial ones such as family independence and satisfaction, nepotism, family legacy, among others. Lastly, Burkart, Panunzi & Shleifer (2003) note that family CEOs, as opposed to nonfamily CEOs, perceives intangible benefits from directing and perpetuating their positions as firm managers. Zwiebel (1996) highlights that dividend policy may be viewed as the optimal response of partially entrenched managers. They might trade-off their empire-building ambitions in order to prevent control challenges. Although privately-held family firms can free themselves from the discipline imposed by the corporate control market, they increase the agency threat posed by "self-control" (Jensen, 1998) ; hence this "control challenge" could instead stem from other minority shareholders, including other family factions. Hu & Kumar (2004) find the likelihood of dividend payments, and their amount, is significantly and positively related to factors that increase CEO entrenchment.
Based on the above arguments, we assume that a partially-entrenched family CEO derives both monetary and non-monetary benefits, and given the majority-minority shareholder agency tension, minority shareholders (other family members or non-family shareholders) will press for more dividends. Accordingly, we put forward the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Family involvement in management will increase the likelihood of dividend payments and their level.
Family involvement in ownership
Regarding family involvement in ownership (FIO) and dividend policy when the family firm has minority shareholders, agency theory suggests that concentrated ownership could be considered as a strong governance mechanism. Indeed, agency costs should be attenuated given the concentrated nature of family ownership, usually undiversified equity holdings, and control of management (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983) . Shleifer & Vishny (1986) state that large shareholders have enough wealth invested in the firm to compensate the cost of monitoring the CEO. In short, controlling shareholders have both the ability and the monetary incentive necessary to supervise managers and mitigate agency costs (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; De Massis et al., 2013) . A controlling family can remove managers who do not act in accordance with a value-maximizing strategy (Bjuggren & Palmberg, 2010) .
Both Villalonga & Amit (2006) and Sciascia & Mazzola (2008) found that FIO have positive effects on firm performance, and hence on firm value. Due to the lower agency costs by ownership concentration, no dividends or lower dividends should be required by minority shareholders.
However, there are also arguments that FIO could give rise to agency conflicts. For example, Sacristán-Navarro et al. (2011) posit that within family firms, conflicts of interest between shareholders may appear where families as owners protect their own interests. Even within family shareholders, conflict of interest could arise between family members in different roles, fostering misunderstanding among majority and minority shareholders (Boles, 1996; Miller & Rice, 1988; Swartz, 1989) . Additionally, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) argue that agency costs to minority shareholders could be worse due to the presence of an entrenched dominant shareholder. In the framework of our discussion, this could imply that minority shareholders should press for more dividends to mitigate agency problems.
In sum, FIO may mitigate agency conflicts due to managerial misbehavior and, at the same time, accentuate agency conflicts among shareholders. The context could determine if the net effect is positive or negative for minority shareholders. Kowalewski, et al. (2010) , among others, argue that in countries with weak corporate governance institutions, concentrated ownership may be effective in solving agency problems because of its potential to lower monitoring costs.
One should expect in emerging markets that the presence of a majority shareholder should increase the likelihood of supervision over the CEO and reduce the probability of opportunistic behavior, creating shared benefits of control for minority shareholders that exceed other agency costs generated by ownership concentration 1 . In this context, dividend policy should not play so crucial a role in controlling agency problems associated with the CEO. Hence, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Family involvement in ownership will reduce the likelihood of dividend payments and their level.
Family involvement in control
This study considers family involvement in control (FIC) when families use control-enhancing mechanisms that increases the wedge between their voting to cash flow rights. These structures include multiple share classes, pyramids, cross-holdings, voting agreements, and disproportionate board representation (Villalonga & Amit, 2006 . Accordingly, the following hypotheses concern the two control-enhancing mechanisms most commonly used in Colombia: pyramidal family control and disproportionate board representation. Several studies (Villalonga & Amit, 2009 , Sacristán-Navarro & Gómez-Ansón, 2007 Sacristán-Navarro & Gómez-Ansón, 2007) . This control-enhancing mechanism could allow families to extract pecuniary and non-pecuniary private benefits, such as high compensation, related-party transactions, empire building, social status and societal power, recognition as successful entrepreneurs, and appointment of family members to management positions (Dyck & Zingales, 2004; Bjuggren & Palmberg, 2010) . Several studies, summarized by Morck, Wolfenzon & Yeung (2005) , illustrate the importance of governance problems within pyramidal business groups. If pyramids exacerbate agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders, as stated in Bebchuk, Kraakman, & Triantis (2000) , then minority shareholders should press for more dividends to mitigate wealth expropriation.
However, Almeida & Wolfenzon (2006) and Villalonga & Amit (2009) Other large shareholders in pyramids may mitigate wealth expropriation of minority shareholders through monitoring managers and moderating family influence (Maury & Pajuste, 2005) . In Spain, where there is large presence of pyramidal family structures, the existence of another significant shareholder may counterbalance the potential extraction of family private benefits (Sacristan-Navarro, et al., 2011) .
This positive argument may also apply in private family firms in the Colombian context; unlike ordinary "retail investors", minority shareholders are generally more sophisticated investors, such as other wealthy families, equity and pension funds, international investors and other large private firms. In sum, this positive effect of contestability among majority and minority shareholders within pyramids will likely mitigate agency problems, and dividend policy should not play so crucial a role,. Therefore, if the tunneling effect has a first order effect while potential blockholder contestability has a second order effect on firm value, the net expected result can be stated in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3a: Family involvement in control through pyramidal structures will reduce the likelihood of dividend payments and their level.
A final hypothesis concerns the impact on dividend policy resulting from a disproportionate family board representation. Considerable theoretical and empirical evidence drawn from economics and finance literature (Hart & Moore, 1974; Jensen, 1986; Zwiebel, 1996; Myers, 2000; Gomes, 2000) posits that free cash flow not paid to shareholders may be diverted by insiders to enjoy private benefits; hence minority shareholders press for more dividends. We argue that this tension could also be present in the context of closely held family firms.
On the one hand, family board representation could bring several benefits such as a long-term perspective or longer investment horizon, less managerial myopia, and better management supervision (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Stein, 1988 Stein, , 1989 James, 1999; Sciascia and Mazzola, 2008) . Family representation on the boards could generate shared benefits and mitigate agency conflicts with minority shareholders by establishing long-term relationships with customers, suppliers, and capital providers (Anderson, Mansi & Reeb, 2003; Sacristán-Navarro, et al., 2011) .
On the other hand, a disproportionate family board representation, i.e., when the percentage of family members on the board exceeds their cash flow rights, could elicit the adverse effects associated with a pure control-enhance mechanism. Villalonga & Amit (2009) value. In line with the classical view played by dividends in mitigating agency problems (Jensen, 1986) , minority shareholders will try to remove free cash flow from the CEO to avoid misuse or wealth expropriation, even in the context of closely held family firms. These arguments support the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3b: Family involvement in control through a disproportionate board representation will increase the likelihood of dividend payments and their level.
Method
Description of the database
Our sample is based on an unique dataset that combines firm-level information for closely held companies with affiliation status to business groups, a feature not commonly found in current research on corporate finance, governance, or family firms. Financial, ownership, and boardrelated information is drawn largely from two Colombian government agencies, the Financial Superintendence (Superintendencia Financiera, SFIN) and the Superintendence for Commercial Societies (Superintendencia de Sociedades, SSOC). SFIN is the financial regulator for all security issuers of stocks and bonds; SSOC supervises and monitors corporate restructuring and bankruptcy processes. Additionally, SSOC maintains financial records and notes for mediumand large-size privately owned firms. Notes to financial statements are subject to statistical confidentiality and include 16 appendices per company, listing in some cases major shareholders, appointments to the board, CEO, auditing firms, and parent-subsidiary commercial relations. We drew additional information relating to directorships and CEOs from Chambers of Commerce where companies are registered. depositary institutions mostly commercial banks and 8 electric utilities all of them former state own enterprises. All these firms were security issuers registered at SFIN. The next filter consisted in firms without information at the second ownership layer (excluding 7,325 firms).
This condition implies both consider solely firms with majority and minority shareholders, which is the focus of our study, and firms within pyramids where we can identify the ultimate owner.
We imposed two additional filters to the 1,284 remaining companies in the sample: i) firms must report complete information of ownership and boards for at least 3 consecutive years (excluding 600 firms) and ii) affiliated firms per economic group must represent at least 50 percent of the group's total number of companies (excluding 161 firms). The later constrain means that if in a given business group is formed by 20 firms, we need at least 10 or more affiliated companies to that group to remain in the sample. This allows us to build more accurate information regarding the ultimate owner's control within the business group that affect firms´ dividend payout policy.
[Insert Table 1 in terms of asset value, almost 40% of all firms that report financial information to the SSOC.
Dividend and family involvement variables
This study employs two dependent variables to analyze dividend policies. The first is a dividend dummy, which takes the value of 1 when firms decide to pay a dividend, and zero otherwise. This variable captures a firm's ex ante decision to distribute net earnings. The second variable is the dividend ratio, defined as the amount of dividend payout divided by total assets. We divide dividend payout by assets rather than sales, because holding companies included in the sample do not report sales but usually pay high dividends. Lipson et al. (1998) and Lee (2010) Control equals 1 when the family has pyramidal control over the firm through indirect ownership. And finally, Majority Family Board dummy is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the participation of family members on the board is more than 50%. This is a good proxy for a disproportionate family board representation because in our sample, when families are the largest shareholder, they own on average 33.22% of the firm's equity (median of 27.45%).
Following Villalonga & Amit (2009) , we want to capture with this variable how families using this control-enhancing mechanism can appoint a disproportionate number of directors in excess of his ownership rights.
Control Variables
Econometric analysis takes into account 16 variables to control for firm characteristics. The first five are financial variables that are correlated with the firm's dividend policy, such as return on assets (ROA), leverage, and growth opportunities (three for the current values and two for the lagged values of ROA and leverage). The second set of controls is comprised of four idiosyncratic variables that may affect the dividend decision, and are also used extensively in empirical research on dividends and ownership: firm age, firm size, business group affiliation and diversification. 2 Five controls relate to corporate governance; we consider board size, the fraction of non-family external directors, and the turnover fraction among board members. Inclusion of these controls is consistent with empirical research on family firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006; King & Santor, 2008; González et al., 2012 González et al., , 2013 . Similarly, participation of the CEO on the board and the presence of external auditing firms were also included. Lastly, we include contestability as a variable that captures the actual contest challenging the largest block-holder when unable to control the company directly (Maury & Pajuste, 2005) . Definitions and methodology for all indicators and variables included in the econometric analysis are presented in appendix 1.
Empirical model
The estimating equation models the partial effects of family involvement through management, ownership, and control over dividend ratios. Insofar as the sample includes several firms that paid no dividends during the span of years analyzed, estimations follow a Tobit model. Notably, the empirical model is left truncated at zero, meaning that the variable under analysis is not empirically observed at this value. The empirical regression is specified as an unobserved latent variable y*, one that is not always observed, as follows:
where and X is a vector of independent repressors.
The observed variable y i follows an observation rule, in this case:
2 For more details, see Truong & Heaney, (2007) ; Gugler (2003) and references therein.
*´, 1, ..,
Thus, the estimating equation of the dividend payout ratio when data is censored can be written:
where: is the dividend ratio variable, FI is the family involvement vector; CG is the corporate governance vector; and X is the financial and firm characteristics vector.
The model also controls for dummies by year, YEAR, and industrial sector, IND. Hence, estimating Eq.1 follows a classical Tobit cross section-regression. 3 From a corporate governance view, dividend policy in a weak institutional environment becomes a market mechanism for investor protection (La Porta et al., 2000) . Therefore, we also consider the probability of dividends by using a Probit-panel regression model:
where: Y it is the dividend dummy which indicates whether a given firm paid dividends for a particular year and all repressors are the same as those used in the estimating Eq. 1. Table 2 reports the dividend ratio and corporate ownership by largest shareholder (panel A) and shareholder type (panel B). In panel A, we report the total number of observations for each shareholder's participation percentile (column 1), the percentage (column 2), the number of 3 Panel-Tobit and Tobit regressions generate similar regression coefficients, and no problem emerges under homoscedastic residuals. When heteroscedastic residuals are present, there is no self-evident way to obtain robust White-Hubert standard errors on the regression coefficients variance-covariance matrix. Moreover, "panel Tobit algorithm relies heavily on normally distributed errors for estimates consistency" Cameron & Triverdi, (2010: 619) . 
Results
Descriptive statistics
observations that feature dividends (column 3), and the mean and standard deviation of the dividend ratio among dividend observations (column 4). A higher equity fraction for the largest shareholders, as shown, seems to imply a lower likelihood of dividend payout (column 2); dividend ratio tends to increase with equity fraction for the largest shareholders, and stabilizes once participation rises above 50% (column 4). This pattern is consistent with the notion that the largest shareholders who hold control of the firm prefer earnings retentions instead of dividend payouts.
Panel B shows the largest shareholder type, with dividend ratio and its frequency. This univariate analysis suggests that direct ownership by the state or by families implies a higher likelihood of dividend payout (column 6); however, without a robust econometric model it is not possible to argue any kind of causality among these variables. Although there are no clear differences among the remaining types of shareholders, families are usually behind trust funds (used as legal vehicles to control firms with pyramidal ownership structures), which show the lower likelihood of dividend payout. Accordingly, dividend payments seem to be lower inside pyramids.
[Insert Table 2]   Table 3 presents a statistical summary of all variables. The last two columns display the test of differences of means and medians by two-tailed t-tests and the non-parametric rank sum test for all control variables classed by dividend and non-dividend firms. Panel A shows financial, idiosyncratic, board structure, and block-holder contestability controls. Panel B considers all family involvement variables. These data show that dividend-paying firms are older, larger, less leveraged and more profitable than non-dividend firms. Furthermore, dividend firms have larger boards on average, a higher participation of outside directors, and higher contestability across block-holders. Last, the mean (median) for group diversification shows that dividend firms belong, on average, to less diversified groups, and exhibit slightly lower affiliation rates to business groups. Hence, a firm seems to be more likely to pay dividends when it is either not affiliated or belongs to less diversified business groups.
As respects family involvement, panel B shows that about 25% of firms in the overall sample feature a family CEO, but this percentage is higher for companies that pay dividends. The largest blockholder is related to the founding family in 19% of the companies, but this involvement is higher for the sub-sample of dividend firms. In terms of control through pyramidal structures, dividend firms show less involvement, which seems to indicate that pyramidal family control results in lower dividend payments. Regarding family control through a disproportionate board representation (majority family board dummy), about 22% of firms in the overall sample feature this kind of family involvement, but this percentage is higher for companies that pay dividends (31%). All the above differences are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The next section turns attention in analyzing how different types of family involvement affect firms' dividend policy.
[Insert Table 3]
Family involvement and level of dividend
The core results of the Tobit regressions are reported in Table 4 columns 1 and 2, which specify the dividend ratio as the dependent variable. Note that there is no statistical evidence to support Hypothesis 1 (H1), which predicted that a family CEO would lead to increased dividend payments. According to regressions in columns 1 (current values of control variables) and 2
(lagged values of control variables), FIM has no statistical effect on the firm's level of dividend payment.
Regression results support Hypothesis 2 (H2), which predicts that family involvement through ownership, as the largest shareholder, would lead to lower dividend levels. Family ownership reduces the level of dividend payment by 1.65 percent. Similarly, supporting Hypothesis 3a (H3a), when the family controls the firm through pyramidal structures (pyramidal family control), their impact on dividend payout is also negative, reducing the level of dividend payment by 1.99 percent. Disproportionate family board representation (majority family board dummy) increases dividend ratios by 2.61 percent, as predicted by Hypothesis 3b (H3b).
Certain important determinants of the payout ratio besides family involvement are worth highlighting. First, financial indicators affect dividend ratios, as expected. Total leverage and growth opportunities are negatively related to dividend ratio, while return on assets is positively related. These effects hold (except for growing opportunities) even taking one lag period for leverage and return on assets (Column 2). Second, the regression coefficients of idiosyncratic variables, such as firm size and age, are positive and significant. These are expected results, consistent with previous dividend studies (Fama & French, 2001; Hu & Kumar, 2004) .
Third, corporate governance variables impact dividend ratios. When a firm's CEO is also a board member, this implies a negative premium of 1.3 percent on dividend ratios. Moreover, the presence of an auditing firm also reduces dividend ratios by 1.46 percent. Board turnover positively affects dividend payment. One standard deviation change (0.25) in directorate composition during a given year raises payout ratio by 51 basic-points. In contrast, the presence of outside directors has no effect, since this variable is statistically not significant. Block-holder contestability also has no effect on dividend payout. Fourth, the level of business group diversification exerts a significant and negative impact on the level of dividend payments. Chen et al. (2005) report similar findings regarding our control variables.
Lastly, diagnosis tests of Tobit regressions show that the overall model is significant according to chi-square tests, and reported standard errors of regression coefficients are robust. The variance covariance matrix follows a cluster robust weighted estimate under the assumption that observations are independent across clusters.
[Insert table 4]
Family involvement and the likelihood of dividend payments
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 4 present the results of the random effects Probit panel regressions model following the empirical specification in Eq. 2. Again, there is no statistical support for the claim in H1 that a family CEO has a positive influence on the probability of dividend payments.
On the other hand, there is statistical support for H2, showing that family involvement in ownership (FIO) as the largest shareholder has a negative impact on the likelihood of dividend payout. Regarding FIC through pyramidal control (H3a), regression coefficients are not statistically significant in this estimation. FIC through a disproportionate board representation (majority family board dummy) increase the likelihood of dividends by 15.04% (Column 3), supporting H3b. Hence, the econometric results of the Probit random effects model are in the same direction as those presented for the levels of payout ratio.
Multilevel effects
As we mention before, the majority of the firms in the sample are affiliated to the five largest non-financial conglomerates in Colombia. This fact raises the question whether dividend policy is driven by the affiliation to a specific conglomerate. In that sense, we estimate the intra-class correlations (IC) defined as the proportion of the group-level variance to total variance for the study two dependent variables (dividend ratio and dividend dummy). We take into account the business-group affiliation as the highest-level dimension; that is, considering that firms are nested within business groups. We used seven groups: the top-five largest conglomerates, the nonaffiliated firms' group, and a group made up by the reminder 23 business groups. A high IC (close to 1) implies that one additional firm in a business group provides little valuable information. Hence, high intra-class correlations suggest performing multilevel regressions.
The IC ratios are displayed at the bottom of table 4 (columns 1 and 3) running the full regressions equations. For the full Tobit regression, the IC ratio is 0.006 and for the Probit model is 0.002, leading us to disregard multilevel regressions associated with business group affiliation.
These low ICs seem to be puzzling because it could be expected that dividend policy is decided at the business group level. However, the low ICs could be explain by the different levels of family involvement across firms within the same business group. The same family behind a business group has a differentiated level of involvement in the firms belonging to that group. In some of them, the family is involved in management, ownership, and through the board of directors, but in others, the same family may be involved in control through pyramids. Therefore, the family effect on dividend policy is different even within the same business group.
Robustness tests
This section presents an instrumental variable analysis to control for endogeneity and double causality among the independent variables. Empirical literature in corporate governance stresses the potential endogeneity between corporate governance fundamentals and firm managerial choices, such as those regarding capital structure, investment or dividend policies. We tackle endogeneity issues in the empirical model by including robustness checks based on instrumental variables estimations. Two variables -firm leverage and family ownership -are considered to have a circular relationship with either payout ratio or the likelihood of dividend payments. The discussion that follows focuses on the endogeneity between dividend policy and family ownership. Clearly, families as majority shareholders can influence decisions on dividend policy; on the other hand, families can decide to maintain ownership in firms expected to make low dividend payments in order to control higher free cash flow levels 5 .
The starting point to address empirically the above endogeneity problem is to restrict attention to the case of a single continuous endogenous regressor in a binary outcome model, since the dividend ratio and the likelihood of dividend payments followed Tobit and panel-Probit regression models. In that sense, we consider a linear latent variable: We performed an econometric analysis regarding the endogeneity between dividends and debt. The main finding results show that negative relation between debt and the likelihood of dividend payments. Specifically, higher levels of debt reduce the flow of capital available to shareholders, and might influence dividend policy. However, firms with demanding dividend policies might incur lower levels of debt in order to settle a tacit obligation contracted with their shareholders. These IVs regressions uses asset tangibility (proxy of collateral) plus the first lag of the leverage ratio as main the instruments. Regression coefficients kept their size and sign. Results are not displayed for space reasons and are available under request.
whether the founding family is the largest shareholder. This binary variable in Eq. (3a) - (3b) is replaced by the largest blockholder equity share as its closest proxy. In fact around 43% of the sample the founding family is the largest blockholder directly or indirectly through investment firms and trust funds. The next discussion concerns to ownership instruments.
The reduced form Eq.3b uses three main instruments: i) the lag of the second largest blockholder share, ii) firm size proxy by the asset tangibility ratio, and iii) cash flow volatility that captures managerial risk aversion. The first instrument follows the standard econometric procedure for an unidentified IV system when there is no a proper instrument. In general, in time series settings the lagged variable influences its contemporaneous value and is less likely to be influenced by current shocks, that is: We found that the second blockholder equity share vary over time more than the largest blockholder share, and its lag turned out a robust regressor in the reduced form equation. From the corporate governance perspective this fact is important in the case when there is no absolute control for any blockholder. Thus, if the second block increased its share will be able to contest the control of the largest blockholder, avoiding tunneling and enhancing firm value [Maury & Pajuste, (2005)] The arguments behind the second instrument − firm size − is that the larger the firm's the greater the value of a given fraction of ownership. Therefore, "…the higher price of a given fraction of the firm should, in itself, reduce the degree to which ownership is concentrated.
Moreover, a given degree of control generally requires smaller share of the firm, the larger is the firm" (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985 : 1158 . These authors also provide another argument to expect an inverse relation between ownership and size: "An attempt to preserve effective and concentrated ownership in the face of larger capital needs requires a small group of owners to commit more wealth to a single enterprise" (Ibid., 1985 (Ibid., : 1158 , thus suggesting risk averse owners will demand higher risk-adjusted cost of capital, discouraging owners of larger firms from attempting to maintain highly concentrated ownership. The third instrument firm cash flow volatility is a proxy for firm idiosyncratic risk, and all else being equal, might induce blockholders to rebalance their equity shares and for which firm control is most useful. Following the arguments of Demsetz & Lehn (1985) : "…the noisier a firm's environment the greater the payoff to owners in maintaining tighter control" (Ibid., 1985 (Ibid., : 1159 . Therefore, high volatility environments should give rise to more concentrated family ownership structures.
There are three empirical approaches in estimating a binary outcome models with endogenous regressors: the structural or parametric one (MLE), the two-step procedure or partial parametric model that uses a minimum chi-square estimator (Newey, 1987) , and the standard IV approach (Cameron & Triveldi, 2010) 6 . [Cameron & Triveldi, 2010) original empirical model. A second minor change was to substitute the proxy concerning board overrepresentation by the fraction of family members in the board 7 .
Several comments are worth highlighting. On average those coefficients are 41% more efficient. Thus, endogeneity of ownership is well supported from the empirical standpoint. Fourth, Probit estimates keep the results as well. In general, firms will have lower probability of paying dividends when the wedge of the family controlling blockholder increases, but this effect is outset by the involvement in control through disproportionate board representation. However, endogenous models the family CEO variable turns significant at 10% on the probability of dividend payout. The same effect is observed in corporate governance controls such as firm outside director ratio or whether the CEO is also a board member. These findings are consistent with the expected sign. In particular, a change of one standard deviation [0.28] in the outside director ratio will raise the likelihood of dividend payments by 2.2 percent. At the same time if the CEO is member of the board he reduces the probability of paying dividends by 6.6% [Col.6 and Col.8] . Fifth, the output includes a test of the null hypothesis of no endogeneity, which is not rejected, meaning that ownership is endogenous in the structural equation of the IV system 8 . This finding is important due to those factors that are affecting blockholders' shares (i.e. firm size) will have an effect on the probability and the level of dividend payout. Sixth, instruments tests based on the linear IV model indicates that the chosen instruments are exogenous according to Sargan-Hansen test, and they jointly are relevant for ownership according to the F test of the first stage regression.
[Insert Table 5 ]
Two additional consistency tests were performed on the above econometric results. First we looked at the difference between the largest family shareholder (family ownership variable), and the controlling family shareholder, allowing for the possibility that the largest family shareholder is not necessarily the controlling one due to the separation between equity and voting rights.
Accordingly, the family ownership variable was broken in two categories: "Family Ownership with equity share greater than 50 percent", i.e., a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the largest shareholder is a family with 50 percent or more of the firm's shares, and 0 otherwise, and "Family Ownership with equity share less than 50 percent". Regressions show similar results in terms of signs, statistical significance and magnitude.
Second we analyzed the influence of holding firms and trust funds on our results. Families are usually behind these kinds of companies used as legal vehicles to control firms, and this fact can bias the results. We decided to test the findings leaving out these legal vehicles that are not working companies and our main results remained. Finally, other econometric specifications were analyzed to check consistency. In particular, random effect estimates of the dividend ratio yielded similar, although weaker results. We calculate the variance inflation factor showing a low level of multicolineality among our regressors. The results of the above consistency checks are available upon request.
Discussion and Conclusions
This article analyzes how FIM, FIO, and FIC influence agency problems between majority and minority shareholders, and how the level and likelihood of dividend payment are used as mitigating mechanisms. We use a sample of Colombian closely held firms, departing from the traditional empirical literature based on developed countries listed firms. Colombian firms share several characteristics with other emerging markets, e.g., high ownership concentration, family business groups, and low investor protection. Our findings show that family influence, both in relation to the level and likelihood of dividend significantly differ according to the type of family involvement.
FIM does not have significant effects on dividend policy. The arguments behind H1 stated that a partially-entrenched family CEO derives both monetary and non-monetary benefits, and given majority-minority shareholder agency tension, minority shareholders (other family members or non-family shareholders) will press for more dividends. However, we find that family CEOs has no impact on the amount or likelihood of dividend payments. One plausible interpretation is that family CEOs neither alleviate nor worsen agency problems between majority and minority shareholders. This suggest that benefits associated with family CEOs, such as the reduction of agency costs because of the interests alignment between owners and managers (Fama & Jensen, 1983) , longer investment horizon and less managerial myopia (Stein, 1988 (Stein, , 1989 James 1999) , among others, compensate the disadvantages deriving from a nonmonetary goal orientation (Lee & Rogoff, 1996; Bertrand & Schoar, 2006) , nepotism (Pérez- González, 2006) , and other agency threats by altruism (Schulze et al., 2001; Kowalewski et al., 2010) .
As argue in H2, FIO reduces the amount and likelihood of dividend payout. Families affect dividend policy by reducing the level and probability of dividends due to the supervision they exert as majority shareholders, which reduces management agency problems, and the need to use dividends for this purpose (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983) . However, FIO also could give rise to agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders. In the family business context, conflicts of interest between shareholders may appear where families pursue their own interests (Sacristán-Navarro et al., 2011), and even within family shareholders conflict of interest could arise (Boles, 1996; Miller & Rice, 1988; Swartz, 1989) . Hence, FIO may mitigate management agency costs and, at the same time, accentuate agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders. The net effect should be mediated by the context, and this could explain differences in results when studying the effect of FIO on agency problems. Our results suggest that in a country with weak legal protection to minority shareholders, such as Colombia and other emerging markets, FIO creates shared benefits of control for minority shareholders that exceed other agency costs generated by ownership concentration.
In terms of FIC through the use of pyramidal structures (H3a), and in opposition to the traditional view of this control-enhancing mechanism, our results suggest less agency costs between majority and minority shareholders inside pyramids. Hence, this family involvement Regarding FIC through disproportionate board representation, which is considered by Villalonga & Amit (2009) as a pure control-enhancing mechanism, we find the expected positive and significant effect on both the level and likelihood of dividends (H3b). This result is consistent with the classical role played by dividends in an agency context; that is, minority shareholders press for dividends as a mechanism to mitigate agency problems. This may happen because the disproportionate board representation by families create incentives to pursue the interests of the family or different family factions (Schulze et al. 2003; Martin de Holan & Sanz, 2006; Block, 2012) , expropriating minority shareholders.
This paper contributes to the current empirical literature on corporate finance, governance, and family firms in several ways. First, this paper deals with dividends as mitigating mechanisms alleviating the majority-minority shareholders agency tensions within the context of closely held family firms, an approach not commonly found in the literature. Our interest is analyze how will minority shareholders in a family firm look at the potential agency tensions is reflected by dividend policy.The finding results contribute to the growing literature on agency problems inside family firms (Schulze et al. 2003; Schulze et al. 2001; Clarysse et al., 2007; Martin de Holan & Sanz, 2006; Block, 2012) .
Second, most of the empirical findings in family firms' literature are based on listed firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006 Sacristán-Navarro & Gómez-Ansón, 2007 , Kowalewski et al., 2010 and little is known about the huge universe of closely held family firms. This is important because some of the results found using samples of listed firms are not directly applicable to closely held firms. Therefore, this paper contributes to a better understanding of this kind of firm, which is recognizes as an important but understudied organizational form.
Third, research on family firms usually views a family business as a single unit, ignoring the different ways families may influence corporate finance and governance decisions. This study follows the approach of Villalonga & Amit (2006 , considering family involvement in three dimensions: management, ownership, and control (pyramids and disproportionate board representation). Defining family firms parting from only one of these dimensions could lead to misleading results and neglect the multidimensional family effects on firm outcomes, such as agency conflicts and dividend policy.
Fourth, even though the sample is restricted to Colombia, this context contributes to a better understanding of family-firms in emerging markets. These countries are generally characterized by low investor protection, family involvement, high ownership concentration, and pyramidal structures through business groups aimed at enhancing firm's control, shaping scenarios where it is not only interesting but also necessary to investigate family firms. Hence, the study contributes to the scant stock of empirical literature on corporate finance, governance and family firms in Latin America, which is an understudied region that has gained relevance for its capital markets dynamics during the last decade. Table 3 
-Control variables -Descriptive Statistics and differences in means and medians
Notes: Panels A and B display the mean, median and standard deviation for variables related to financial aspects, firm idiosyncrasies, blockholder contestability and family involvement. The sample splits the group of firms by dividend and non-dividend status. It also reports the parametric and non-parametric statistics for the differences in means and medians. The null hypothesis is the non-existence of differences between the two groups of firms along with their statistical significance. Sources: Our own estimates. 
Dividend payout
Amount of dividend payout in colombian pesos for each firm i and for each year t.
Dividend dummy
Dummy variable equal to 1 when there is a dividend payout, and 0 otherwise.
Dividend ratio
Amount of dividend payout divided by total assets Family CEO Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO has the family last name, and 0 otherwise.
Family Ownership
Dummy variable equal to 1 when the family is the largest shareholder, and 0 otherwise.
Pyramidal Family Control
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the family has the control of largest blockholder´s firm through direct or indirect ownership, and 0 otherwise.
Family Board [%]
Percentage of directors who have the same CEO last name or the same founding family last name.
Majority Family Board
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the participation of family board members is more than 50%, and 0 otherwise.
Return on Assets -ROA Return on assets after interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (or net income) divided by total assets.
Total Leverage
Total leverage as the ratio of total liabilities divided by total assets.
Growth opportunities
Firm's growth opportunities as the percentage growth in real sales.
Firm age
Firm age as the number of years since the firm's inception.
Firm size
Firm size as the natural log of the firm's total sales.
Assets tangibility
As the sum of inventories and fixed tangible assets divided by total assets.
Firm volatility
Firm risk (Volatility) as the standard deviation of the operating margin for the previous three years.
Group diversification
Is defined as the number of sub-sectors represented in the group with which the firm is affiliated. The sample encompasses 61 sub-sectors as classified by the SSOC.
Group affiliation dummy
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is affiliated with a business group, and 0 otherwise.
Board size
Total number of directors. Includes principals and substitutes.
Outside director [%]
Percentage of board members who have not been managers of the firm, who were never managers in any related firm, who do not sit on any of the boards of related firms and do not have family ties with founding family or the CEO as far as the scope of the sample allows us to tell besides than being on the board of directors for all interval of time.
Board Turnover [%]
Percentage of directors of year t that are no longer on the board at year t+1.
CEO board dummy
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm's CEO sits on its board, and 0 otherwise.
Auditing firm
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the audit of financial statements is done by a firm, and 0 otherwise.
Equity 1-4
The fraction of cash flow rights held by the first, second, third, and fourth largest blockholder, respectively
Contestability Index
As the ownership of the second and third blockholder relative to the largest equity block. CI = (equity 2 + equity 3)/equity 1. 
Dividend payout policy variables
